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Recent Cases
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ENTIRETY PROPERTY-DIVORCECONVERSION BY SPOUSE
Ray v. Ray

Husband brought an action for divorce, and wife filed a counterclaim requesting an accounting, alleging that plaintiff husband had taken and converted certain property which was jointly owned. This property consisted of a bank account,
a garage business, life insurance on the husband's life of which the wife was
originally beneficiary, proceeds from the sale of the family automobile which were
deposited in the joint account, and the household furniture of the family. On trial
the court granted plaintiff a divorce and rendered judgment on the defendant's
counterclaim in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant wife appealed, and the Springfield Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cause, holding defendant to be
entitled to one-half of the entirety property accumulated during coverture. This
was a case of first impression in Missouri, and squarely held that accounting, at
least where ancillary to a divorce proceeding, is the proper remedy when entirety
property has been converted by a spouse during coverture.
The procedural propriety of the wife's counterclaim was not drawn in question, plaintiff evidently considering it to be properly before the court. It is interesting to note that before the adoption of the 1943 Civil Code, 2 and even sometimes
thereafter, it was held that the court in a divorce action had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate the property rights of the parties. 3 However, due to the 1943 code's enactment of an enlightened counterclaim statute,4 and the subsequent decisions
pursuant to its provisions, doubt was cast upon that line of precedent. Thus, in
Builderback v. Builderback,5 it was decided that a defendant husband might bring
a counterclaim for an accounting in a divorce action. That case differed from the
instant case in that the accounting there did not relate to entirety property. In
the Builderback case the court relied upon the authority of State ex rd. Fawkes v.

Bland,6 in which the Missouri Supreme Court en banc held that a defendant wife
had a legal right to cross-petition for separate maintenance in a divorce action.
The cross-petition for separate maintenance was regarded as a counterclaim
properly brought under section 37 of the code, the court further holding that
1.
2.
353-97.
3.
4.
5.
6.

336 S.W.2d 731 (Spr. Ct. App. 1960).
References to the Civil Code are to section numbers in Mo. Laws 1943, at
E.g., Singleton v. Singleton, 239 S.W.2d 773 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951).
Mo. Laws 1943, at 370, § 37.
241 Mo. App. 508, 244 S.W.2d 377 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
357 Mo. 634, 210 S.W.2d 31 (1948) (en banc).
(513)

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1962], Art. 10

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 27

under section 37 such a counterclaim was mandatory rather than permissive. Any
further doubt in this area has been dispelled by present Rule 88.08 of the Missouri
Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides that "in a petition for divorce or
separate maintenance, the provisions of these rules with respect to joinder of
separate claims and causes of action shall be permitted," thus foreclosing any
argument that joinder of claims in a divorce action is improper under the new
rules.
The sole question of law presented on appeal in the instant case was whether,
certain personalty having been acquired by purchase with money drawn from a
joint bank account of husband and wife, a counterclaim for an accounting was premature at the time of the divorce action. Plaintiff husband contended that, in the
absence of evidence of any contrary intention, the property was to be presumed to
be held by the entirety. The estate by the entirety so referred to exists as it did
at common law and is not lessened or destroyed by statute in Missouri, since all
of the common law incidents remain,1 and each is seised per tout, et -non per my.8
Since each was seised of the whole rather than a part, plaintiff insisted that one
cannot convert his own property, and that therefore defendant was not entitled to
relief on her counterclaim. In agreeing with plaintiff's contention as to the nature
of the estate involved, the court cited Cullum v. Rice, in which it had been stated:
"Following the common law as we do in Missouri, we cannot escape the conclusion
that all choses in action, payable to husband and wife or to husband or wife are
presumed to be estates by the entirety."9 But, while agreeing as to the type of
estate involved in the present case, the court refused to acquiesce in the plaintiff's
argument as to the result which must necessarily be produced. The court reached
this conclusion after examining several prior Missouri cases, some of which are
noted below.
In Smtith v. Smiitk,1o the court held that a wife could sue her husband for
conversion of her separate property, but expressed some doubt as to whether she
could sue during coverture for conversion of entirety property.
In Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v.Saxy,1 the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the Married Women's Actsl modified an estate by the
entirety to the point that a husband's interest in the property might be sold under
execution for the husband's debt. The Married Women's Acts were held to be
remedial legislation in derogation of the common law and therefore to be construed
only to remove the mischief against which they were aimed. The common law rule
that entirety property may not be partitioned without the consent of both spouses
still applies, the Married Women's Acts notwithstanding.
In Rezabek v. Rezabekl 3 a trial court held that there cannot be an estate by
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Cullum v. Rice, 236 Mo. App. 1113, 162 S.W.2d 342 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942).
Ahmann v. Kemper, 342 Mo. 944, 948, 119 S.W.2d 256, 257 (1938).
236 Mo. App. at 1118, 162 S.W.2d at 344.
300 S.W.2d 275 (Spr. Ct. App. 1957).
273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918).
§§ 6864, 6869, RSMo 1889.
196 Mo. App. 673, 192 S.W. 107 (St. L. Ct. App. 1917).
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the entirety in personal property in this state, relying on Polk's Adm'r v. Allen.14
Citing Johnson v. Johnson'5 as authority, the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that
this position was overruled and that there definitely can be an estate by the en-

tirety in personal property in Missouri. The court went on to hold that a husband
was entitled to one-half of the rents and profits accruing from a leasehold, and

therefore could maintain an action for an accounting when these rents and profits
were collected by his estranged wife and wrongfully withheld.
In disposing of the argument that a wife must wait until she is divorced and
then bring a separate action to protect her interest in property which has been converted into a tenancy in common by the severance of the marriage relationship, the
court in the instant case held that such reasoning was manifestly impractical in
light of Smith v. Smith,' 6 and referred to Tendrich, v. Tendric.,'7 a federal case
from the District of Columbia Circuit. The Tendrich case is cited for the proposition that "since the courts created the theory of 'oneness,' they ought to be able
to make an exception to it."i s Perhaps this point is questionable, however, in light
9
a later case from the same circuit, which held
of the decision in Hogan v. Hogan,1
that entirety property may not be partitioned without the consent of both spouses
unless at least a limited divorce has been acquired.
The usual public policy argument was refused on the ground that since the
marriage partners were warring over the entirety property, a failure to grant relief
would not save a doomed marriage. The argument that the fiction of complete
indivisible interests must either be upheld or destroyed was met on the hypothesis
of agreement and acquiescence. Noting that a husband and wife can, by agreement, change the character and attributes of an estate20 or permit its destruction
by acquiescence and consent, 21 the court reasoned that a husband's denial of the
existence of an entirety title, by the taking and conversion of personal property,
should offer the injured spouse an option to accept and agree to such a proposal of
destruction, and to proceed to have her interest in the property judicially protected.
The court then unequivocally held that a spouse may maintain an action for
accounting against the marriage partner after a conversion of personal property
owned by the entirety.22 But quaere, what remedy has a spouse who does not wish
to agree to the destruction of an entirety estate?
It is important to note that the reasoning of the court in no way improves a
creditor's position in regard to the accessibility of entirety property for the satisfaction of judgment debts. By limiting the exception to the rule to a right which
must be personally exercised by a spouse, and which, therefore, may not be exer-

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

19 Mo. 467 (1854).
173 Mo. 114, 73 S.W. 202 (1903).
Supra note 10.
193 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
Ray v. Ray, supra note 1, at 734 n.4.
250 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Stewart v. Shelton, 356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W.2d 395 (1947).
Zahner v. Voelker, 11 S.W.2d 63 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928).
Ray v. Ray, supra note 1, at 734.
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cised by a representative of a spouse (i.e., a judgment creditor), the court apparently foreclosed what might have been a new field for creditors.
Furthermore, a suit based on the theory that the property is held by the
entirety may not be the sole remedy available where a spouse converts property
owned jointly with the marriage partner. The joint tenancy and joint adventurer
theories appear to be equally available, and in some cases may offer even more
workable solutions.
In Hopkins v. Hopkins2 the St. Louis Court of Appeals stated, obiter dictum,
that livestock owned by husband and wife was jointly owned and that partition
could be maintained under Section 528.620 of the 1949 Revised Statutes of Missouri. This position seems to be contrary to the great weight of authority and has
not been further followed in this state. However, this statute was construed in
Halferty v. Karr to mean that "the term 'joint owners' was intended to be understood in its most comprehensive sense, and to embrace all cases where the property
in question is owned by two or more persons, regardless of the special nature of
their relationshipor how it came into being."2 ' Therefore, it would seem possible, by
this alternative line of reasoning, to destroy one of the incidents attributable to
entirety property, i.e., the requirement that both spouses must join in consenting to
a partition thereof.
Another method of handling the problem was demonstrated in Brooks v.
Brooks. 25 There the court allowed an accounting by treating the husband and wife
as joint adventurers.
Thus an attorney seems to have at least two other available theories
with which to attack a problem of this type, both with a reasonable expectation
of success. It should be noted, however, that the argument that the property was
held by the entirety, and therefore may be partitioned only by consent of both
marriage partners, was neither raised nor considered in these last two cases. In a
proper case raising this point, then, the result might well be different unless the
relief sought is ancillary to a divorce proceeding. At any rate, in such a case these
theories would undoubtedly be limited to use by the spouse personally, again
precluding any extension of a creditor's rights.
The Springfield Court of Appeals seems to have taken the lead in emancipating married women from the bonds forged by the strict application of medieval
legal fictions. 20 The development of this line of cases seems to reflect the deliberate
and careful accomplishment of a laudable design-that of preventing frauds and
impositions upon married women by a strict application of theoretical property law.
This equalization of the respective legal positions of the spouses is due to the
modern practice of extending equitable doctrines to cover the gaps left by a rigid
application of the common law. The trend was aptly expressed by the court in
Smith v. Smith, in the following words: "It is now apparent that by legislative
23. 260 S.W.2d 833 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953) (dictum).
24. 188 Mo. App. 241, 245, 175 S.W. 146, 147 (K.C. Ct." App. 1915).
(Emphasis added.)
25. 357 Mo. 343, 208 S.W.2d 279 (1948).
26. See, for example, Harrellson v. Barks, 326 S.W.2d 351, 361 (Spr. Ct. App.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/10

4

et al.: Recent Cases
RECENT CASES

19621

revolution and judicial evolution a wife is completely emancipated from domestic
and economic vassalage in so far as her separate property is concemed."27 The
instant case leaves no doubt that the evolution of this emancipation is still in
progress, since the principle expressed now extends to a conversion of entirety
property by a spouse.
JAMEs L. ANDING

TAXATION-MONEY PAID UNDER AGREEMENTS IN ANTICIPATION
OF DIVORCE-WHEN DEDUCTIBLE
Commissioner v. Lester'
Taxpayer entered into an agreement in anticipation of divorce which provided
for the support and maintenance of his wife and three minor children.2 Payments
under the agreement were to be reduced by one-sixth upon the death, marriage, or
emancipation of any of the three children. Taxpayer deducted the amounts paid
under the agreement from his income in 1951 and 1952, contending that these
amounts were includible in the gross income of his wife by reason of Section 22
(k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and deductible by him by reason of
section 23(u).3 The Commissioner contended that the portion of the agreement
which called for a reduction of the payment upon the happening of certain specified
contingencies "fixed" this portion of the payment as payable for the support of
minor children, and thus this amount was specifically excepted from the provisions
of section 22(k). 4 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner on the theory that
it could reasonably be inferred from reading the agreement as a whole that the
parties intended one-half (three times one-sixth) of the money paid under the
agreement be used for the wife for the support of the children., The Second Circuit
reversed the Tax Court on the theory that the terms of the agreement allowed
the wife an independent beneficial interest in the entire sum paid under the agreement and therefore did not fix an amount as payable for the support of minor
1961); Smith v. Smith, supra note 10; Builderback v. Builderback, supra note 3.
27. Smith v. Smith, supra note 10, at 280.
1. Lester v. Commissioner, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
2. Agreement entered into April 16, 1951, and ratified, confirmed, and
approved by a California court rendering an interlocutory judgment of divorce on
April 27, 1951. Lester v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 22(k), 23(u); 56 Stat. 816-17 (now INT. REv.
CODE OF

1954, §§ 71, 215).

4. Section 22(k), which provided that certain alimony payments be includible in the gross income of the wife, made this distinction: "This subsection
shall not apply to that part of any periodic payment which the terms of the decree
or written instrument fix, in terms of an amount of money or a portion of the
payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of such
husband." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(k); 56 Stat. 816-17 (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 71(b)).
5. Lester v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959).
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children., The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: The agreement did not fix
any amount as payable for the support of minor children, and the deductions to
the taxpayer were allowed.
Prior to 1942 no deduction was allowed to a husband for amounts payable as
alimony to a former spouse7 except where the payments were made by way of a
trust over which the husband had relinquished sufficient control, and then a deduction was allowed only in states in which the terms of the agreement operated as a
complete discharge of the husband's liability for support of the wife.8 The result
was that in some states the wife enjoyed the beneficial interest in the funds and
the husband paid the income tax thereon, while in other states the wife enjoyed
the beneficial interest in the money but had to pay the income tax thereon. In
1942 Congress enacted Sections 22(k) and 23(u) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939, which shifted the tax burden from the husband to the wife on amounts
payable as alimony. Payments which were fixed by the terms of the agreement as
payable for the support of minor children were excepted from these provisions.
A split arose among the courts as to what was necessary to fix portions of
the payments as sums payable for the support of minor children. The Tax Court,10
and the First,"1 Sixth, 12 Seventh,' 3 and Ninth 4 Circuits took the position that if
the agreement as a whole provided a reasonable indication that the parties intended to earmark a certain portion of the payment for the support of minor
15
children, this amount was fixed as payable for the support of minor children.
1
The Second Circuit,' in which the Lester case arose, took the position that no
portion of the agreement was fixed for the support of minor children so long as

6. Lester v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
7. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
8. Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940).
9. Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940).
10. A list of all of the cases can be found in the annotations in 4 A.L.R.2d
252, § 10 (1949), and in the A.L.R.2d Supplemental Service volumes.
11. Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959).
12. Deitsch v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957); Budd v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947).
13. Mandel v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950).
14. Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 913 (1958).
15. In the Elsinger case it was said:
The general rule which we here approve is that when the settlement agreement, read as a whole, discloses that the parties have earmarked or
designated or apportioned or allocated the payments to be made, one part
to be payable for alimony, and another part to be payable for the support

of children, with sufficient certainty and specificity to readily determine
which is which, without reference to contingencies which may never come
into being, then the "part of any periodic payment" has been fixed "by the
terms of the decree or written instrument ....

Id. at 308.

16. Well v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
958 (1957); Estate of Hirshon v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1947).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/10
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the, wife enjoyed a beneficid interest in that portion of the funds payable under
the agreement. 17
It is significant to note the difference, prior to the Lester case, between the
agreements considered by those courts which applied the "reasonable indication"
test and the agreements considered by the Second Circuit, which applied the
"beneficial interest" test. The former agreements provided a general payment for
alimony and support, to be reduced by a specified amount upon the happening of
certain contingencies, such as the death, marriage, or emancipation of the children,
or the remarriage of the wife.' 8 With but one exception,' 9 these courts held
that the specific provisions for reduction controlled the general provisions as to
the use of the funds and fixed part of the agreement as payable for the support
of minor children. These courts did not look to see if the amounts were considered
fixed for the children under state law. The latter agreements, arising in the Second
Circuit cases, provided a general payment for alimony and support and a reduction
of that general amount only upon the remarriage of the wife;20 in construing these
agreements the Second Circuit held that the specific provision for reduction did
not control the general provisions as to the use of the funds and therefore failed to
fix any part of the agreement as payable for the support of minor children. The
Internal Revenue Service indicated that it would follow the rationale of the
"reasonable indication" test, but agreed to follow the result of the Second Circuit
2
cases on similar facts. '
In holding that the agreement in the Lester case did not fix a portion of the
payment for the support of minor children, the Supreme Court looked first to the
legislative history of the alimony provision of the code. The Congressional Reports
indicate that one of the purposes of enacting the alimony provision of the code
was to put an end to the variance in result allowed by conflicting state law.22
Congress realized that the wife would be paying taxes on amounts which would
be used in discharge of the husband's duty to support the children. 23 The reports
17. "ElIf sums are to be considered 'payable for the support of minor
children,' their use must be restricted to that purpose, and the wife must have no
independent beneficial interest therein." Weil v. Commissioner, supra note 16, at
588.
18. See cases cited notes 10-13 supra.
19. The holding in Deitsch v. Commissioner, supra note 12, is contrary to
the line of cases which construe similar agreements, and is disapproved in Eisinger
v. Commissioner, supra note 14, at 308. The court in the Deitsc case distinguished
the holding in that case from the earlier Sixth Circuit case of Budd v. Commissioner, supra note 12, but did not disapprove the test used in the Budd case, even
though it rested its holding upon the Weil case, supra note 16. "Clearly, as held by
this court, the agreement construed in the Budd case ... 'earmarked' $200 a month
for the use of the son. In the instant case, considering the settlement contract as a
whole, we find no provision which indicates that the $3,000 yearly payment is to
be made for the benefit of the children alone." Deitsch v. Commissioner, supra
note 12, at 536.
20. See cases cited note 16 supra.
21. Rev. Rul. 59-93, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 22.
22. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942).
23. Ibid.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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indicate that the term "fix" was used synonymously with the phrase "specifically
'24
designate."
It seems to this writer that nothing in the Congressional Reports compels one
decision or the other. At first glance, the goal of ending a variance in tax consequences resulting from the variance of state laws appears to reject the idea that
reference should be made to state law to determine whether or not the terms of
the agreement fix an amount as payable for the support of minor children. It may,
be true that Congress intended to put an end to reference to state law which
resulted in conflicting tax consequences to persons who enjoyed like beneficial
interests, 21 but it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended that an agreement should be construed without reference to state law in determining whether
beneficial enjoyment existed.26 The latter question, and not the former, is the
problem presented in construing the clause which excepts payments made for the
support of minor children from the general alimony provision, and the Court
failed to make this distinction.
Following the discussion of the legislative history of the alimony provision,
the Court in the instant case rejected the "beneficial interest" test in so far as it
would look to state law; 27 and then rejected the "reasonable indication" test in
so far as it suggests that a showing of a "sufficiently clear purpose" 28 is adequate
29
to fix the payment.
It has been suggested that the Court in the Lester case ended the controversy
as to when an agreement fixes an amount as payable for the support of minor
children. 30 The Court declared that "if there is to be certainty in the tax consequences of such agreements the allocations to child support made therein must
be 'specifically 'designated' and not left to determination by inference and conjecture."'' 1 Under this rule it would seem that unless the agreement provided one
sum of money for alimony and a separate sum for child support, in specific
language, the burden of taxation would be shifted to the wife. 82

24. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 7378, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 48 (1942).
25. See cases cited notes 7-9 supra.
26. 15

J.

TAXATION 208 (1961).

27. "We... are unconcerned with the variant legal obligations, if any, which
such an agreement, by construction of its nonspecific provisions under local rules,
imposes upon the wife to use a certain portion of the payments solely for the
support of the children." Commissioner v. Lester, supra note 1, at 304.
28. See note 15 supra.
29. Commissioner v. Lester, supra note 1, at 305.
30. 45 MARQ. L. REV. 123 (1961); 36 TUL. L. REV. 167 (1961).
31. Commissioner v. Lester, supra note 1, at 306.
32. This view is further buttressed in the opinion:
Congress was in effect giving the husband and wife the power to shift a
portion of the tax burden from the wife to the husband by the use of a
simple provision in the settlement agreement which fixed the specific
portion of the periodic payment made to the wife as payable for the
support of the children.
Id. at 304.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/10
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One caveat to this interpretation of the case should be considered. The agreement in the Lester case, unlike the agreements found in the circuit court cases from
which the "reasonable indication" test was -evolved, contained a provision that the
whole of the payment was to be ended upon the remarriage of the wife. This
provision was inconsistent with the theory that part of the payment was intended
for the support of the children, and this inconsistency was noted in the Court's
opinion. 83 It might be that if the agreement had provided for a reduction of onehalf upon the death, marriage, or emancipation of the three children, and a similar
reduction of one-half upon the remarriage of the former spouse, the combination
of these consistent provisions would "specifically designate" the allocations for child
support. Because of this, the cautious tax planner who wants to shift the burden
of taxation to the wife without possible resort to litigation would be better advised
to restrict the specific phrases in the agreement to those found in the Lester and
Weil cases.
CaLEs HART

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ANNULMENT OF ADOPTIONS
In re McDuffee'
Margaret Ruth Bramble was six years old when she was adopted by Mr. and
Mrs. John McDuffee in 1956. A little over two years later the McDuffees petitioned
a circuit court of St. Louis County to annul the decree of adoption, claiming that
the child was then suffering from mental disturbance which manifested itself in
antisocial behavior, and that she required institutional custody. Margaret had been
abandoned by her natural parents over a year before she was adopted, and the
McDuffees claimed that the mental disturbance had its origin before she was
placed in their custody. The petition stated "that it would be to the best interest
of said child that the aforesaid decree of adoption be annulled and said child be
placed in the custody of an institution equipped to handle her mental instability
with its attendant behavior pattern." 2 The guardian ad litem moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, arguing that since
the decree of adoption had become final the circuit court had no power to annul
the adoption other than upon those grounds enumerated in Section 453.130 of
the 1959 Missouri Revised Statutes. The circuit court granted the motion to
dismiss, and the St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed. The cause was then transferred
to the Supreme Court of Missouri, sitting en banc.
In its opinion, s the court of appeals agreed that the power to annul a decree
of adoption, beyond the term of court in which it was granted, lay exclusively in
33. Id. at 305.
1. 352 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1961) (en banc), affirming 341 S.W.2d 315 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1960).
2. 352 S.W.2d at 24.
3. In re McDuffee, 341 S.W.2d 315 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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the statutory grounds set forth in section 453.130.4 Since neither "best interests
of the child" nor "mental disturbance" was included among those grounds, the
court felt that the petition was insufficient. Petitioners relied primarily upon In re
Zartman's Adoption.5 In that case a decree of adoption had been entered, but
later at the same term of court the guardian ad litem moved to set the decree aside,
alleging the unfitness of one of the adoptive parents. Before that motion was
argued, and without any notice to the parties, the court on its own motion set the
decree aside. This was reversed as a denial of due process, but the Missouri Supreme
Court remanded the case for a hearing on the guardian's motion, indicating that
if the allegations could be proved the adoption could be set aside. The court of
appeals distinguished the case on the basis that the decree there had not become
final, and held that as the decree in the McDuffee case had become final, the court
had no authority, beyond that granted by statute, to annul the adoption.
The supreme court held that in dismissing the petition the two courts below
had reached the correct result, but the suggestion that the statutory grounds were
exclusive was rejected. The court noted that any court exercising general equity
jurisdiction would undoubtedly have the power to vacate an adoption decree upon
the traditional equitable grounds of fraud, unavoidable accident or excusable
mistake. The court further noted that as the sole ground upon which adoption
may be decreed is the welfare of the child, the higher welfare of the child could be
a sufficient basis for annulling an adoption., The court went on to state, however:
Despite . . . the primacy of the welfare of the child as grounds for adoption or annulment, the courts evince a decided reluctance to annul such a
decree and especially is that the case where the annulment is sought by
[I]n the absence of some compelling reason not
the adoptive parents ....
here shown, we think it should never be done solely at the instance of the
adoptive parents (in cases other than those enumerated in § 453.130)
Countwhere the child would be cast aside to become a public charge ....
less parents find themselves confronted with similar situations. In most
instances, to the extent of their means . . . they achieve the crowning
satisfaction of procuring the treatment needed by such children. The
record in this case shows that the natural parents have abandoned the
of that child that a court of
child. It cannot be in the best interest
7
equity . . . decree it a similar fate.
4. § 453.130, RSMo 1959. The statute reads as follows:
Whenever a person adopted under this chapter shall develop venereal
infection as a result of conditions existing prior to the time such person
was adopted, or shall develop feeble-mindedness or epilepsy, or shall prove
to be a member of a race, the members of which are prohibited by the laws
of this state from marriage with members of the race to which the parents
by adoption belong, a petition setting forth such facts may be filed at
any time within five years after such adoption with the court which
decreed the adoption, and if on a hearing the facts in such petition are
established, the said court may enter a decree annuling the adoption and
setting aside any and all rights and obligations that may have accrued by
reason of said adoption. (Emphasis added.)
5. 334 Mo. 237, 65 S.W.2d 951 (1938).
6. Citing 1 AM. JUR. Adoption of Children § 72 (1936); 2 CJ.S. Adoption
of Children § 45 (1936); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 888-912 (1948).
7. 352 S.W.2d at 27-28.
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I.

NoN-STATUTORY

GROUNDS IN GENERAL

In assuming in the present case that a court of equitable jurisdiction would
have the authority to annul an adoption upon general equitable grounds, including
those of fraud, duress or mistake, the supreme court appears to be upon relatively

solid footing. While cases in Missouri are few,8 the statement may be supported
by decisions in other jurisdictions.9 The use of such theories seems to be governed,
for the most part, by the same factors governing their use in any other type of
equitable proceeding.10 Thus, in cases involving a claim of mistake, the mistake
must be as to a material existing fact,"1 and in cases based upon fraud, it is often
2
held that the complaining party must have been reasonably alert and cautious.'
It is perhaps of some significance to note that, with but few exceptions, the
cases based upon the above mentioned grounds have usually arisen through an
attack by the -naturalparents; and, further, that among those cases involving an
8. Outside of the present case, there appear to be only two other Missouri
cases touching upon the question, and in neither of them, as a matter of fact,
does it appear that the adoption was actually annulled. See Nealon v. Farris, 131
S.W.2d 858 (St. L. Ct. App. 1939) (evidence insufficient to show fraud; alleged
mistake was not as to an existing fact); Wilson v. Caulfield, 228 Mo. App. 1206, 67
S.W.2d 761 (St. L. Ct. App. 1934) (adoption attacked on grounds of undue influence; original verdict for defendant; trial court's decision to grant new trial
sustained on appeal). The supreme court itself in the present case admitted that
"there is a dearth of direct authority in this state as to the circumstances under
which a decree of adoption may be set aside." 352 S.W.2d at 26.
9. E.g., Adoption of Bird, 183 Cal. App. 2d 140, 6 Cal. Rptr. 675 (2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960); Arnold v. Howell, 219 P.2d 854 (Cal. App. 1950); Rose v. People,
111 Colo. 220, 139 P.2d 261 (1943); Meleski v. Havens, 129 Conn. 238, 27 A.2d
159 (1942); Lambert v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So. 2d 393 (1942); Vaughan v.
Hubbard, 38 Idaho 451, 221 Pac. 1107 (1923); State ex rel. Bradshaw v. Probate
Court of Marion County, 225 Ind. 268, 73 N.E.2d 769 (1947); Westendorf v.
Westendorf, 187 Iowa 659, 174 N.W. 359 (1919); Barber v. Barber, 280 Ky. 842,
134 S.W.2d 933 (1939); Falck v. Chadwick, 59 A.2d 187 (Md. 1948); Adoption of
Glenn, 29 Erie 302 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1946). See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d
887-912 (1948).
10. Nealon v. Farris, supra note 8, at 861.
11. E.g., Nealon v. Farris, supra note 8. In this case, both parents were suffering from tuberculosis, and were warned by the sanatarium doctor and nurses that
they would not recover without the aid of a miracle. The father did in fact die
soon after this and the mother decided, without any undue influence being exerted
upon her, to provide for her child while she could. She thus gave her consent to
the adoption of the child by a St. Louis family. The mother did recover, however,
and sought to have the adoption annulled. While the court understood the unfortunate circumstances, no relief was allowed, it being stated that the mistake
must be as to an existing fact, and not simply as to a matter of what might happen
in the future.
12. In re Bartholomew, 29 Cal. App. 2d 343, 84 P.2d 199 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
1938); Gaban's Petition, 158 Fla. 597, 30 So. 2d 176 (1947); Sheperd v. Jensen,
260 Mich. 111, 244 N.W. 249 (1932); Myers v. Myers, 197 App. Div. 1, 188
N.Y.S. 527 (1921); In re Young, 259 Pa. 573, 103 AtI. 344 (1918); In re Kutz, 11
Pa. D. & C. 766 (C.P. 1928); In re Sipes, 24 Wash. 2d 603, 167 P.2d 139 (1946);
Williams v. Briley, 137 Wash. 262, 242 Pac. 370 (1926); Lane v. Pippin, 110 W.
Va. 357, 158 S.E. 673 (1931); Carlson v. MacCormick, 178 Wis. 408, 190 N.W.
108 (1922).
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attack by the adoptive parents, where the child would become a public charge,
only one has granted the annulment.' 3 In the few other cases in which an annulment has been sought by the adoptive parents under these circumstances, relief
has been refused on the theory that the claim was based upon selfish and inequitable motives.-x Thus, in actuality, there is a relative dearth of authority to support
ihe proposition that the adoptive parents may seek annulment upon general
equitable grounds. In theory, however, it would seem that, in a proper case,
annulment upon these grounds should be granted to the adoptive parents as
readily as to the natural parents.15
II. "BEST

INTERESTS OF THE CHILD" AS BASIS FOR ANNULMENT

The exact import of the supreme court's language regarding the "best interest
of the child" is somewhat hazy. It was stated at one point that "upon clear showing that the higher welfare of the child demands such action courts of equity may
annul a valid decree of adoption."' ' But, since the petition to annul was actually
dismissed, precisely what the court meant is uncertain. Furthermore, while this
factor is often mentioned in annulment cases, there does not seem to be a single
case, in this state or any other, that has actually granted an annulment upon
these grounds or that gives a clear idea as to what the phrase might mean when
used in this context.
If the adoptive parents and the natural parents join in the petition, a court
may be more apt to find that it is to the best interest of the child that he be
returned to his natural parents."7 This, of course, would alleviate the difficulty
encountered in the present case-that of casting the formerly adopted child aside
to become a public charge. However, even in this situation a court's discretion may
13. Department of Pub. Welfare v. Morningstar, 128 Ind. App. 564, 151 N.E.2d
150 (1958). In this case, the Department had assured petitioners, when the child
was being considered for adoption, that it came from a background similar to
their own and that the child's father had a responsible job in Washington, D.C.
But by the time the child entered school serious behavior problems and mental
deficiencies had manifested themselves, and the child required care in a closed
psychiatric unit. Petitioners were able to show that at the time of adoption the
Department knew that the family background was not as it had been represented,
but instead resembled a sociological study of some of the residents of Tobacco Road.
The child's father was known to have committed incest with the older daughters,
one of whom was feeble-minded and the other a prostitute. The mother was
promiscuous, and had given birth to both Negro and white children. At the time
of adoption the child was thought by the Department to be feeble-minded or
retarded. The Indiana court granted the annulment upon the basis of fraud, without any substantial discussion of the child's welfare.
14. Buttrey v. West, 212 Ala. 321, 102 So. 456 (1924); In -re Anon., 213
N.Y.S.2d 10 (Surr. Ct. 1961); In re Sherman, 90 Misc. 858, 78 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Surr.
Ct. 1948); Allen v. Allen, 330 P.2d 151 (Ore. 1958); Stanford v. Stanford, 201
S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
15. See, e.g., Department of Pub. Welfare v. Morningstar, supra note 13.
16. 352 S.W.2d at 27.
17. Re Bell, 310 Mich. 394, 17 N.W.2d 227 (1945) (dictum); Re McKenzie,
44 Pa. D. & C. 86 (Orphans' Ct. 1942).
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be exercised. In a recent New Jersey case,' for example, an illegitimate child, after
having been adopted, sought to be returned to her natural mother. All parties
consented. The court, however, found that the child's welfare would be better served
by leaving her with the adoptive parents, emphasis being placed upon the fact
that the natural mother had failed to testify as to why she wanted the child back,
and that the child apparently wished to escape an atmosphere of rather strict
discipline.
As to the general principle involved, the New Jersey court stated:
All courts adhere to the view that the paramount consideration is the
welfare of the child. If the annulment clearly appears to be in the best
interest of the child, this would constitute proper grounds for annulment
at the instance of either the natural or the foster parents, providing that
there are no public policy considerations which override the consent of all

to the abrogation of the adoption. Naturally, courts will not allow an
abrogation of an adoption if it is premised on the desire of the foster
parents to rid themselves of a "bad bargain" or a change in heart on the
part of the natural parents. The courts have uniformily agreed that a
mere change in attitude or regret does not of and in itself constitute
proper grounds for annulment'- (Emphasis added.)
Even in a situation where all parties consent, however, it is difficult to
imagine many factual settings in which the "welfare of the child," alone, would
be sufficient to override the social interest in making adoptions permanent in
character.
In view of these considerations, it is difficult to believe that the Missouri
court in the present case actually meant that an adoption may be annulled solely
upon a basis denominated "best interest of the child," whatever that phrase may
mean, unless perhaps the consent of all parties-the natural parents, the adoptive
parents, and the child-is gained. Indeed, the court's own later statement that
the "welfare of the child is . . .a ¢major factor to be considered in connection with

such other factors affecting justice and fairness,"' 0 might seem to imply that
adoptions will not be annulled solely upon that basis. When the opinion is read
in this manner, it would seem that the court was simply indicating that the wetfare of the child is a factor of importance-even one of major importance-but not
that it is to be relied on exclusively. And this, certainly, would appear to be an
entirely acceptable and supportable viewpoint.
Thus, if later courts pursue a middle of the road interpretation, it seems
probable that the relationship created by a decree of adoption will not be
disturbed (except under statutory sanction) unless the original decree is first subject to attack upon the general equitable grounds heretofore mentioned, or perhaps
unless all parties consent, and in addition, the best interest of the child will be
served by an annulment. The "welfare of the child" then becomes, as it should, an
important equitable factor, but not a basis in and of itself.
18. Adoption of L., 56 N.J. Super. 46, 151 A.2d 435 (P. Ct. 1959).
19. Id. at 50, 151 A.2d at 437.
20. 352 S.W.2d at 27. (Emphasis added.)
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POSSIBLE STATUTORY GROUNDS-FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS

Petitioners made no attempt to base their claim for annulment upon the
statutory ground of "feeble-mindedness," set out in section 453.130.21 While "feeblemindedness" has never been defined in this context by the Missouri courts, it is at
least arguable that the term might be sufficiently broad to cover such a case as
this one. A Minnesota court has held that the term should be defined, as suggested
by the British Mental Deficiency Committee, as:
[A] condition of incomplete development of mind of such a degree or kind
as to render the individual incapable of adjusting himself to his social environment in a reasonably efficient and harmonious
manner and to neces22
sitate external care, supervision or control.
Obviously, if in the present case the McDuffees had sought to characterize Margaret's condition as "feeble-minded," and if the Missouri Supreme Court had been
willing to define the term as above suggested, the result reached might have been
different.
CONCLUSION

The actual holding in the present case, clearly supported by what little authority there is, is that a petition to annul an adoption which alleges only the
mental disturbance of the child and the fact that it must have institutional care
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In view of the fact
that a natural parent would not be allowed to sever his relationship with his
child and cast him adrift under similar circumstances, and since the adoption
statute is intended to make the relationship of adoptive parent and child the
same as that of natural parent and child,23 this result seems correct.
While a reading of the case standing alone might lead one to think that the
court had indicated a willingness to grant annulments upon a simple finding that
the "welfare of the child" would be better served thereby, when read against the
background of the existing cases and authorities the opinion seems much more
limited. In reality, then, it would appear that the court was merely indicating that
courts of equity will not be helpless to exercise some discretion in matters relating to the welfare of adoptive children.
In advising parents who are adopting children it might be wise to point out
that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to terminate the relationship that
is being assumed, and, therefore, that changes in circumstances, conflicts in
personality, and disappointment in the later development of the child will have to
be accepted.
JOHN CURTIS TINDEL

21. § 453.130, RSMo 1959. See note 4 supra.

22. Re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 563, 13 N.W.2d 487, 492 (1944).
23. § 453.090, RSMo 1959. The statute states that when a child is adopted
"said child shall thereafter be deemed and held to be for every purpose the child
of his parent or parents by adoption, as fully as though born to him or them in
lawful wedlock." See also St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76
S.W.2d 685 (1934).
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-MODIFICATION OF FUTURE PAYMENTS
UNDER ALIMONY AND SUPPORT DECREES-TEN YEAR
LIMITATION UPON
Sisco v. Siscol

The respondent was granted a divorce from the appellant in a circuit court of
St. Louis County on July 16, 1948. Under the provisions of the decree the respondent
received custody of the children born of the marriage and was awarded seven dollars per week per child for their maintenance, and one dollar per month as alimony.
No payment was ever made under the decree, and no revival was ever obtained
thereon. Respondent's next action upon the decree was instituted April 6, 1959,
when she made a motion for execution, later amended to a motion to modify the
alimony and maintenance provisions. The trial court modified the provisions for
support and maintenance of the children but refused to modify the alimony provisions, reasoning that the judgment was dormant for failure to revive. Appellant
appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals. Held: Under Section 516.350 of the
1959 Revised Statutes of Missouri,2 both, alimony decrees and decrees for support
and maintenance of children are conclusively presumed to have been paid and
satisfied within ten years after the date of their entry, in the absence of statutory
revival or payment to renew the running of the statute. Since in the present case
more than ten years had elapsed, both decrees were dormant and there could be
no action to modify.
The case is one of first impression in Missouri, standing for the proposition that
future payments under a maintenance decree may not be modified when the decree
has remained stagnant for a period of ten years. The case also contains dictum
that alimony decrees of the same character may not be modified. In view of the
decisions in Missouri interpreting section 516.350 in relation to divorce decrees,
this was a foreseeable decision.
Section 516.350 is not a statute of limitations in the usual sense of the phrase.8

1. 339 S.W.2d 283 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960).
2. The statute reads as follows:
Every judgment, order or decree of any court of record of the United
States, or of this or any other state, territory or country, shall be presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years fror the
date of the original rendition thereof, or if the same has been revived
upon personal service duly had upon the defendant or defendants therein,
then after ten years from and after such revival, or in case a payment
has been made on such judgment, order or decree, and duly entered upon
the record thereof, after the expiration of ten years from the last payment
so, made, and after the expiration of ten years from the date of the last
payment, such judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid, ind
no execution, order or process shall issue thereon, nor shall any suit be
brought, had or maintained thereon for any purpose whatever.
3. Wormington (Woolsey) v. City of Monett, 358 Mo. 1044, 218 S.W.2d

586 (1949)

(en banc); 34 AM. JuR. Limitation of Actions §§ 4, 6 (1941); Annot.,

1 A.L.R. 779, 780 (1919).
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It is, rather, a rule of evidence creating a conclusive presumption 5 that a judgment
has been paid and satisfied within ten years from the date of its rendition, or
from the last revival thereof,6 or from the last payment thereon. 7 At the termination of the ten year period of inactivity the judgment or decree is said to have
become dormant 8 or dead, 9 and no action may be maintained upon it.1°
An underlying principle in the application of this presumption is its restriction
to judgments for money. The terminology of the statute itself creates this limitation."1 The presumption is ever present within cases involving a money judgment,
12
although the principle is seldom stated.
This limitation on judgments is not peculiar to Missouri but is derived from
the common law twenty year limitation on judgments13 "By the common law,
4. Gaines v. Miller, 111 U.S. 395, 400 (1884) (20 year limitation on actions);
Tatum v. Davis, 283 Fed. 948 (8th Cir. 1922); Ballard v. Standard Printing Co.,
356 Mo. 552, 556, 202 S.W.2d 780, 783 (1947); Cobb v. Houston, 117 Mo. App.
645, 654, 94 S.W. 299, 301 (St. L. Ct. App. 1906) (20 year limitation on actions).
5. Section 516.350 provides that the judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid. Supra note 2.
6. Methods for revival are provided exclusively by statute. Papenberg v.
Papenberg, 289 S.W.2d 468 (St. L. Ct. App. 1956).
Revival must be upon personal service. See section 516.350, which states: "(O]r
if the same has been revived upon personal service duly had upon the defendant
or defendants therein .

. . ."See

also Driscoll v. Konze, 322 S.W.2d 824 (Mo.

1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959).
Scire facias may be brought within the ten year period to revive the judgment
or decree. 'Lafayette County v. Wonderly, 92 Fed. 313 (8th Cir. 1899); State

ex rel. Silverman v. Kirkwood, 361 Mo. 1194, 239 S.W.2d 332 (1951) (en banc),
reversing 230 S.W.2d 513 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950); Mayes v. Mayes, 342 Mo. 401,
116 S.W.2d 1 (1938); Goddard v. Delaney, 181 Mo. 564, 80 S.W. 886 (1904)
(en banc); Dreyer v. Dickman, 131 Mo. App. 660, 111 S.W. 616 (St. L. Ct. App.
1908).
7. Tatum v. Davis, supra note 4; Wormington (Woolsey) v. City of Monett, supra note 3 (20 year limitation of action); Ballard v. Standard Printing Co.,
supra note 4; Mayes v. Mayes, supra note 6; Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221
S.W. 1066 (1920) (en banc); Kansas City v. Fields, 270 Mo. 500, 194 S.W. 39
(1917); Crane v. Reinking, 215 S.W.2d 759 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948); Hedges v.
McKittrick, 153 S.W.2d 790 (St. L. Ct. App. 1941); Eubank v. Eubank, 29 S.W.2d
212 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930); State ex rel. Meyer v. Buford, 18 S.W.2d 526 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1929); Dreyer v. Dickman, supra note 6.
8. Tatum v. Davis, supra note 4; Mayes v. Mayes, supra note 6; Nelson v.
Nelson, supra note 7; Crane v. Reinking, supra note 7; Hedges v. McKittrick, supra
note 7; Davis v. Gould, 131 S.W.2d 360 (Spr. Ct. App. 1939); Eubank v. Eubank,
supra note 7; State ex rel. Meyer v. Buford, supra note 7; Remmers v. Wolf's
Estate, 206 Mo. App. 159, 226 S.W. 290 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920).
9. Hauck v. Hauck, 198 Mo. App. 381, 200 S.W. 679 (St. L. Ct.App. 1918).
10. Section 516.350, RSMo 1959: "EN]o execution, order or process shall be
issued thereon, nor shall any suit be brought, had or maintained thereon for any
purposes whatever."
11. Section 516.350, RSMo 1959: "Every judgment, order or decree . . .shall
be presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years ....

'"

(Em-

phasis added.)
12. But see Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 230 Mo. App. 137, 148, 89
S.W.2d 693, 697 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936). (on motion for re-hearing).
13. Gaines v. Miller, supra note 4, at 399; Clemens v. Wilkinson, 10 Mo. (2
Stringfellow) 97 (1846).
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the lapse of twenty years, without explanatory circumstances, affords a presumption of law that the debt is paid . ... "14 Missouri adopted the twenty year
limitation on judgments in Article IV, Section 1, at 396, 1835 Revised Statutes of
Missouri, creating a conclusive presumption subject to rebuttal only by proof of
payment of part of the debt, or by acknowledgment of the debt. After numerous
revisions's the legislature finally adopted Chapter 48, Article 2, Section 4297, 1899
Revised Statutes of Missouri, establishing a conclusive presumption after a period
of only ten years, subject to rebuttal by proof of payment or partial payment, or
by proof of statutory revival. It is this statute which is in existence today as
section 516.350.
Section 516.350 has long been applied to alimony 6 and maintenancel T decrees.
However, the alimony and maintenance decisions in which this statute has formerly
played a role have involved past alimony or maintenance which has accrued at the
time of the action, not alimony or maintenance to accrue in the future. With
respect to these earlier decisions the courts in Missouri have said that decrees of
alimony and maintenance are subject to the incidents of all other judgments for
money' s and, therefore, become dormant after the passage of ten years. This is
true whether the decrees are to be paid in gross or in installments.19 As to installment payments, Missouri courts have said that the-statute runs, as to the judgment
or decree, from the last installment paid 20 and not as to each installment as it
accrues, as most jurisdictions provide.21 Therefore, in Missouri, whether the decree
be for payment in gross or in installments the statute always runs against the
judgment itself and not against the payments as they become due. It is this peculiar
interpretation by our courts which gave rise to the decision in Sisco v. Sisco. The
court there reasoned that since the maintenance had not been acted upon for ten
years the entire maintenance decree was dead or dormant. Since modification
inherently requires the pre-existence of a live decree, it cannot be obtained when
the decree is dormant. This reasoning is further supported by the wording of
section 516.350, which states:
14. Gaines v. Miller, supra note 4.
15. Davis v. Carp, 258 Mo. 686, 700-01, 167 S.W. 1042, 1046 (1914).
16. Tatum v. Davis, supra note 7; Mayes v. Mayes, supra note 6; Nelson v.
Nelson, supra note 7; Chapman v. Chapman, 269 Mo. 663, 192 S.W. 448 (1917);
Biffle v. Pullman, 114 Mo. 50, 21 S.W. 450 (1893); Crane v. Reinking, supra note
7; State ex rel. Meyer v. Buford, supra note 7; Remmers v. Wolf's Estate, supra
note 8; Dreyer v. Dickman, supra note 6.
17. Mayes v. Mayes, supra note 6; Hohler v. Fuches, 156 S.W.2d 21 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1941); Davis v. Gould, supra note 8; Hauck v. Hauck, supra note 9.
18. Mayes v. Mayes, supra note 7; Nelson v. Nelson, supra note 7; Chapman
v. Chapman, supra note 16; Biffle v. Pullman, supra note 16; Crane v. Reinking,
supra note 7; Davis v. Gould, supra note 8; Remmers v. Wolf's Estate, supra note 8;
Dreyer v. Dickman, supra note 6.
19. Tatum v. Davis, supra note 7; Mayes v. Mayes, supra note 6; Nelson v.
Nelson, supra note 7; Crane v. Reinking, supra note 7; Davis v. Gould, supra note
8; Eubank v. Eubank, supra note 7; Remmers v. Wolf's Estate, supra note 8;
Hauck v. Hauck, supra note 9; Dreyer v. Dickman, supra note 6; Annots., 70
A.L.R.2d 1250, 1261 (1960), 137 A.L.R. 884, 892-94 (1942).
20. Ibid.
21. Annots., 70 A.L.R.2d 1250, 1261 (1960), 137 A.L.R. 884, 890-94 (1942).
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rS]uch judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid and no execution, order or process shall be issued thereon, nor shall any suit be brought,
had or maintained thereon for any purpose whatever. (Emphasis added.)
For all practical purposes, then, after the ten year period has elapsed a decree of
alimony or maintenance is no longer in existence.22
One of the leading cases concerning the application of section 516.350, Mayes
v. Mayes,25 contains dictum which might appear in conflict with the decision in
Sisco v. Sisco. It was there stated
that the court which granted the divorce retains jurisdiction until the
majority of the child or children to modify or alter the decree as24to custody
and as to future support and maintenance is well established.
When viewed out of context, this statement might lead one to believe that
emphasis should be placed on the phrase, "until the majority of the child or
children," thus making it appear that any decree of the court becomes indestructible until the majority of the child or children is reached. When the statement is
viewed in the light of the cases from which it is drawn, 25 however, it becomes clear
that the court was simply attempting to emphasize the fact that only the'court
which grants the decree of divorce has jurisdiction to modify or alter it. For this
reason the phrase "until the majority of the child or children," used as the period
of duration of the jurisdiction of the court, must be read as being inherently
limited by section 516.350.
The consequences of the decision in the present case may be important. When
an alimony decree becomes dormant, there appears to be no method of revival.
As to the dormancy of a child maintenance decree, however, there is a remedy.
It was formulated in the case of Davis v. Gould26 and again applied in Hohier v.
Fuches.2 7 In both of these cases custody of the children of the marriage and maintenance for their support had been granted to the wife. In both cases the maintenance provisions had become dormant. The courts held that the dormancy of
the maintenance provisions left the wife in the same position as though there had
never been a provision for maintenance. It was said that under such circumstances
the wife could avail herself of the common law duty of the father to support his
22. This is not true as to custody, for the limitation applies only to judgments and decrees for money.
23. Supra note 6.
24. Supra note 6, at 407, 116 S.W.2d at 4.
25. Kelly v. Kelly, 329 Mo. 992, 47 S.W.2d 762 (1932); In re Morgan, 117
Mo. 249, 22 S.W. 913 (1893) (en banc); Salky v. Salky, 80 S.W.2d 735 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1935); Hays v. Hays, 75 S.W.2d 614 (St. L. App. 1934); Kaestner v. Kaestner, 228 Mo. App. 1043, 58 S.W.2d 495 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933); Thornton v. Thornton, 221 Mo. App. 1119, 2 S.W.2d 821 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928); Barnhart v. Barnhart, 253 S.W. 56 (K.C. Ct. App. 1923); Meredith v. Kranthoff, 191 Mo. App. 149,
177 S.W. 1112 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915); Phipps v. Phipps, 168 Mo. App. 697, 154
S.W. 825 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913); Shannon v. Shannon, 97 Mo. App. 119, 71 S.W.
104 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902); In re Kohl, 82 Mo. App. 442 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900).
26. Supra note 8.
27. Supra note 17.
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children, 28 and could bring an action to be reimbursed for past support provided
by her from the time the maintenance provisions became dormant.
Another solution may be available in this sort of situation. When no provision
has been made in a divorce decree for support and maintenance of the children
of the divorced couple, the court granting the divorce has the power to modify the
decree to provide for such support and maintenance.29 If the analogy made in
Davis v. Gould and Hohler v. Fuckes between a divorce decree with no provision
for maintenance and a decree with dormant maintenance provisions is valid, and
a wife is to be allowed a separate action for past expenses, why should it not be
possible for a court simply to modify a decree to provide anew for maintenance of
the children, as though there had never been any such provisions in the original
decree? This possibility has never yet been raised and adjudicated, and apparently
was overlooked by the respondent in the present case. It becomes apparent, therefore, that the result in Sisco v. Sirco is not as stifling as it may at first appear.
MELVYN WADE WIESMAN

28. See also Kelly v. Kelly, supra note 25.
29. Section 452.070, RSMo 1959:
When a divorce shall be adjudged, the court shall make such order touching the alimony and maintenance of the wife, and the care, custody and
maintenance of the children, or any of them, as, from the circumstances
of the parties and the nature of the case, shall be reasonable, and when
the wife is plaintiff, may order the defendant to give security for such
alimony and maintenance; and upon his neglect to give the security required of him or upon default of himself and his sureties, if any there
be, to pay or provide such alimony and maintenance, may award an
execution for the collection thereof, or enforce the performance of the
judgment or order by sequestration of property, or by such other lawful
ways and means as is according to the practice of the court. The court,
on the application of either party, may make such alteration, from time
to time, as to the allowance of alimony and maintenance, as may be
proper, and the court may decree alimony pending the suit for divorce
in all cases where the same Would be just, whether the wife be plaintiff
or defendant, and enforce such order in the manner provided by law
in other cases.
See generally Lodahl v. Papenberg, 277 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1955); Kelly v. Kelly,
supra note 25; Laumeier v. Laumeier, 308 Mo. 201, 271 S.W. 481 (1925);
Robinson v. Robinson, 286 Mo. 703, 186 S.W. 1032 (1916), overruled on other
grounds iz Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo. 583, 252 S.W.2d 323 (1952); Roberts v.
Roberts, 292 S.W.2d 596 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956); Kaestner v. Kaestner, supra note
25; Auer v. Auer, 193 S.W. 926 (St. L. Ct. App. 1917); Shannon v. Shannon,
supra note 25.
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